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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
By Order of the Utah Supreme Court, this case was poured-over 
to the Utah Court of Appeals on November 6, 1995. This Court has 
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) 
(Supp. 1995) and Utah R. App. P. 3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Whether the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue 
of material fact as to the existence of an express or an implied 
compensation contract between Gina Cook ("Mrs. Cook") and her 
employer Zions First National Bank ("Zions") when Mrs. Cook was 
employed in consideration for certain compensation which included 
the ability and flexibility to take earned leave for needed medical 
care. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See, inter alia, 
Record ("R") . at 251-52; 304-05; 308; 332-33; 334; 437-39; 474-81; 
510; 515-16; 524-25. The standard of review for summary judgment 
is Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary 
judgments are reviewed for correctness. Palmer v. Hayesf 892 P.2d 
1059, 1061 (Utah App. 1995).x 
II. Whether the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
exists within the confines of employment compensation contracts, 
and assuming that it does, whether the trial court erred in finding 
1
 See also the section on Applicable Law, infra. 
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no genuine issue of material fact as to Zions1 performance under 
that implied covenant when Mrs, Cook repeatedly requested the 
opportunity to use her earned sick leave to determine if the lump 
on her lip was cancerous, and Zions denied her requests and by its 
conduct, prevented her from so doing. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See, inter alia, 
R. at 252-53; 307-11; 324-25; 349-48; 474-81; 521; 524; 527-30; 
534-35; 567. The standard of review for summary judgment is Rule 
56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgments are 
reviewed for correctness. Palmerf 892 P.2d at 1061. 
III. Whether the trial court erred by resolving factual 
disputes against Mrs. Cook and by relying on issues neither raised 
by Zions nor properly considered in a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See, inter alia, 
R. at 60-86; 302-366; 386-435; 474-81; 493-95; 493-95; 474-81; 544-
46. The standard of review for summary judgment is Rule 56(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgments are reviewed 
for correctness. Palmerf 892 P.2d at 1061.2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
None. 
2
 Mrs. Cook is not pursuing her claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress on appeal. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
X. Nature of the Case 
This is an action brought by Mrs. Cook as the result of Zions1 
breach of her employment compensation contract. Mrs. Cook claims 
that Zions breached her contract, which specifically included the 
right to paid sick leave, by refusing to allow her time off for 
medical treatment when she needed and requested it. 
II. Course of the Proceedings 
The Complaint was filed on September 14, 1994 in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. (R. at 2.) Mrs. 
Cook demanded a jury, and tendered the appropriate fee on September 
28, 1994. (R. at 31.) Zions served its Answer on October 11, 
1994, (R. at 34), and ten days later, on October 21, 1994, filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 60.) In its accompanying 
memorandum, Zions raised several issues claiming, in pertinent 
part, that "there is no express employment contract", that "Utah law 
does not recognize a breach of an implied-in-fact contract outside 
of the termination context" and that "an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is not recognized in the employment context 
under Utah law." (R. at 63-64; 386-87.) 
III. Disposition of the Trial Court 
Judge David Young accommodated lengthy oral argument on March 
10, 1995, (R. at 572-97) and April 21, 1995. (R. at 508-71.) On 
3 
June 8, 1995, the trial court ruled against Mrs. Cook in a 
Memorandum Decision, attached hereto as Addendum "A". (R. at 474.) 
Final judgment, granting summary judgment against Mrs. Cook and 
dismissing her action on the merits and with prejudice, was entered 
on July 14, 1995. (R. at 490.) Notice of Appeal was filed on July 
18, 1995. (R. at 496.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. General Background: 
1. Mrs. Cook was hired by Zions in May, 1988. (R. at 65; 
95; 250.) 
2. During her full-time employment at Zions, the terms and 
conditions of Mrs. Cook's compensation, including sick leave, have 
not changed, although she has received regular pay increases for 
merit and promotion. (R. 250-51; 304.) 
3. Mrs. Cook has not been terminated by Zions, where she 
remains employed. (R. at 95; 250-51; 304.) 
II. Facts Presented to the Trial Court in Opposition to Zions' 
Factual Claims That Mrs. Cook Had No Contract Providing for 
Compensation in Exchange for Her Services to the Bank: 
4. In May 1988, prior to her acceptance of Zions1 offer of 
employment, Mrs. Cook met with Joyce Misdom, the manager of the 
department in which Mrs. Cook was to be employed. During that 
meeting, Ms. Misdom advised her that after an initial 90-day 
waiting period, Mrs. Cook would automatically earn credits for 
4 
uinvoluntary leaves of absence from work/ which would entitle her 
to a certain number of paid sick days, depending on whether she 
worked part or full time. (R. at 437.) 
5. While Mrs. Cook was considering Zions1 employment offer, 
another representative of the bank met with Mrs. Cook and again 
explained the terms of Zions1 compensation package which included 
paid leaves of absences for sick days. During that meeting, Mrs. 
Cook was again told that she would earn and be entitled to use paid 
sick leave as part of her compensation. (R. at 437.) 
6. Mrs. Cook accepted employment at Zions based on its offer 
of employment compensation. (R. at 438). 
7. Zions' employment offer, as communicated by Ms. Misdom 
and the other bank representative, was memorialized in a written 
agreement. (R. at 437-38.) That document, entitled "Employment 
Benefits Disclosure and Pay Agreement" (hereinafter "Employment 
Agreement"), is attached hereto as Addendum "B". (R. at 438; 441.) 
8. After Mrs. Cook had received an explanation of her 
compensation from Ms. Misdom and the other bank representative, she 
and Ms. Misdom signed the Employment Agreement on July 28, 1988. 
(R. at 438; 441.) 
9. The Employment Agreement lists both Mrs. Cookfs initial 
salary and earned benefits, including involuntary paid leaves of 
5 
absence3 for which she would become automatically eligible as part 
of her compensation package. Specifically, with respect to sick 
leave, the Employment Agreement states: 
Involuntary Absences from Work (leave credit 90-day 
waiting period) — 1 day per month for full-time 
employees; 1 day (8 hours) per 2 months for those working 
at least 20 hours per week. 
(R. at 438; 441.) 
10. The flexibility of being able to take paid sick leave was 
a significant part of Mrs. Cook's compensation package, and was an 
important inducement to her in accepting Zions' employment offer. 
(R. at 438-39.) 
11. Because Zions1 compensation package included paid sick 
leave, Mrs. Cook was willing to work at an hourly rate lower than 
the rate she received from her former employer. (R. at 438.) 
12. Since accepting its employment offer, Mrs. Cook has 
continued to rely on Zions1 representations to provide paid sick 
leave, and has for years earned and used the benefit of paid sick 
leave. (R. at 251-52; 304-06; 308; 439.) 
13. It was Mrs. Cook's understanding from Zions' course of 
dealing, representations and practices, that, as a full-time 
employee, she would receive paid sick leave in partial 
3
 Zions' use of the phrase "involuntary leaves of absences" in 
its Employment Agreement, (R. at 441), is synonymous with the terms 
"sick leave", "sick days" and "short term leave" in the record. See, 
inter alia, R. at 326; 332-33; 335-37; 344-45; 351-53. 
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consideration for her service to the bank. (R. at 251-52; 436-37; 
439.) 
14. Consistent with its practices, Mrs. Cook's Employment 
Agreement and her understanding of her sick leave benefits, Zions 
also has a written policy regarding sick leave which is maintained 
by supervisors and not distributed to employees. (R. at 351-52; 
391.) 
III. Facts Presented to the Trial Court Based on Zions9 Admissions: 
15. Zions1 employees earn sick leave as part of their 
compensation. (R. at 332-33.) 
16. Employees who take sick leave are paid at their normal 
hourly or salaried rate, with standard taxes and withholdings 
deducted from the sick leave compensation. (R. at 326.) 
17. Full time employees earn the right to be paid for sick 
leave and can accumulate eight hours a month for a maximum of 12 
days a year. (R. at 325-26; 334-35; 344; 351-53.) 
18. Pay stubs given to Mrs. Cook by Zions confirm its policy 
of providing Mrs. Cook with earned sick leave. (R. at 321.) 
19. Zions maintains a schedule of the number of hours to 
which an employee is entitled for sick leave, based on how long 
they have worked. (R. at 335; 345; 351.) 
20. At the beginning of 1994, Mrs. Cook had earned 249.76 
hours of sick leave. (R. at 336.) 
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21. As an employer, Zions provides sick leave in order to be 
competitive and to promote the health of its employees. (R. at 
325.) 
22. Zions1 policy and practice is to allow its employees time 
off to obtain necessary medical attention, diagnosis and treatment 
before treatable health problems become serious or life 
threatening. (R. at 471-72.) 
23. Zions publishes an official newsletter known as 
"Newsbreak", which is disseminated regularly to employees. (R. at 
323 and 348.) 
24. Zions1 September 20, 1994 Newsbreak states in pertinent 
part that *[t]he health and welfare of employees are important to 
Zions Bancorporation. Zions policies provide employees with 
adequate time to seek needed medical treatment.n (R. at 349.) 
(Emphasis added.) A copy of the Newsbreak article is attached 
hereto as Addendum "C". 
25. The Newsbreak article is an accurate statement of the 
bankfs position# (R. at 348; 435), and "depicts [Zions1 policy] 
very well." (R. at 411.) 
26. Zions1 employees are required to notify their 
departmental supervisors of their need to take sick leave for 
scheduled medical procedures. (R. at 327.) 
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27. Zions' employees are also required to obtain approval 
from their supervisors before they can use sick leave for scheduled 
medical treatment. (R. at 344; 471-72.) 
IV. Facts Presented to the Trial Court Regarding the Material 
Breach of Mrs. Cook's Compensation Agreement: 
28. In a January, 1994 staff meeting, Gaylene Kenney ("Ms. 
Kenney"), Mrs. Cookfs departmental manager, (R. at 306; 330; 389), 
stated that she did not want anyone to take time off during the 
next several months because of an increased workload in the 
department caused by the department's conversion to a new computer 
system, and Zions1 acquisition of another bank. (R. at 252; 309; 
355) . 
29. Because of the demands placed on her as a result of the 
conversion to the new computer system and the bank acquisition, 
Mrs. Cook was required to work extensive overtime in the first few 
months of 1994. (R. at 252; 309.) 
30. By the beginning of 1994, a lump had appeared on Mrs. 
Cook's lip. The lump was obvious and could readily be seen by co-
workers. (R. at 308; 340-41; 356-57; 361.) 
31. Ms. Kenney also knew of the lump because she could see it 
on Mrs. Cook's lip. (R. at 308; 340-41.) 
32. On January 29, 1994, Mrs. Cook requested one hour off on 
February 1, 1994 to have the lump on her lip removed. (R. at 252; 
309; 362.) 
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33. Mrs. Kenney approved the request for one hour. (R. at 
338-39; 362.) 
34. Mrs. Cook went to her doctor's appointment on February 1, 
1994. However, at that time, her doctor decided that the procedure 
would take a full day and would need to be done in a hospital. 
Therefore, because only a one hour office appointment had been 
scheduled, Mrs. Cookfs doctor did not remove the lump. (R. at 252; 
309.) 
35. After returning to work, Mrs. Cook approached Ms. Kenney, 
and requested one day off for the in-hospital surgical procedure to 
remove the lump on her lower lip as directed by her doctor. (R. at 
252; 309.) 
36. That request, and several other requests for the 
necessary time off made during the first week of February, 1994 and 
in the following months, were denied. (R. at 252; 309-10.) 
37. Mrs. Cook did not take a day off without Ms. Kenney1 s 
permission because she feared that she would be terminated for 
violating Zions1 policy and Ms. Kenney's directive. (R. at 343.) 
38. During February, March and April, 1994, Mrs. Cook 
continued to make numerous requests to Ms. Kenney to use one day of 
her earned sick leave for the medical procedure. (R. at 252-53; 
309-10.) 
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39. Ms. Kenney denies that these requests were made. (R. at 
341; 390; 433-34; 475; 546.) 
40. The surgical procedure was eventually undertaken on May 
20, 1994 with Ms. Kenneyfs approval. (R. at 253.) 
41. On May 31, 1994, Mrs. Cook was notified that she had a 
form of aggressive, malignant melanoma. (R. at 253-54; 310.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In 1988, Mrs. Cook and Zions signed an Employment Agreement in 
which Zions expressly agreed to compensate her with the earned 
benefit of sick leave. Based on that agreement and Zions9 policies 
and practices, Mrs. Cook's sick leave accrued at the rate of one 
day for every month she worked as a full time employee. For 
several years, Mrs. Cook earned, requested and received her sick 
leave as part of her compensation. Prior to her denied requests 
for time off, Zions had not changed or disclaimed either Mrs. 
Cook's contract or Zions1 existing policy and practice of 
compensating its employees with accrued sick leave for needed 
medical treatment. This practice continued until the first several 
months of 1994 when Mrs. Cook's supervisor denied her requests for 
one day of sick leave to undergo an in-hospital procedure to remove 
and biopsy a lump on her lip. During those months, Mrs. Cook's 
supervisor required her to work extensive overtime as the result of 
an exceptionally heavy work load in Mrs. Cook's department. 
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As of January 1, 1994 Mrs Cook had 249.76 accrued and unused 
hours of earned sick leave. Zions, however, requires its employees 
to obtain approval before taking time off for scheduled medical 
treatment. Although the sore on Mrs. Cookfs lower lip did not heal 
and continued to worsen in February, March, April and May of 1994, 
Mrs. Cookfs repeated requests for a single day of sick leave were 
continually denied. Not being able to jeopardize her job and 
health insurance and not knowing whether she had a serious problem, 
Mrs. Cook continued to work while pressing her supervisor for 
permission for a day off work for the surgery. 
When Zions finally allowed Mrs. Cook time off on May 20, 1994, 
her physicians found an aggressive form of skin cancer which had 
metastasized and invaded her lymph nodes. Mrs. Cookfs physicians 
have informed her that her condition is terminal. Zions' refusal 
to allow Mrs. Cook time off work caused a critical and significant 
delay in her cancer treatment, resulting in the progression of the 
cancer and the loss of any opportunity to prevent that progression. 
Zions has admitted that the purpose of its policy and practice 
of allowing employees time off work for medical procedures is to 
allow them to obtain necessary medical attention before health 
problems become serious or life threatening. The terms of Mrs. 
Cook's compensation contract were breached by Zions1 refusals to 
allow her time off when she requested it. Based on Zions1 own 
12 
statement, that "Zions policies provide employees with adequate 
time to seek needed medical treatment/ (R. at 349) , it has also 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which 
exists in Utah and operates within the parameters of all contracts, 
including contracts providing for employment compensation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Applicable Law under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Summary judgment is only proper when "there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P 56(c); Republic Group, Inc» 
v. Won-Door Corp.f 883 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1994). When reviewing 
an order granting summary judgment, the evidence and all inferences 
that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be liberally 
construed in favor of the party opposing the motion. Republic 
Groupf 883 P.2d at 289. The non-movant is required only to 
demonstrate that there is a material issue of fact, not that its 
case is more persuasive than the movant1s. Lamb v. B&B Amusementsf 
869 P.2d 926 (Utah 1993). Any doubts as to whether the non-moving 
party has established an issue of material fact must be resolved in 
favor of the non-movant. Butterfield v. Okudor 831 P.2d 97, 107 
(Utah 1992). The determination of whether the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment is a question of law, and given this view of 
the evidence, is reviewed for correctness. Palmer, 892 P.2d at 
13 
1061; Kleinert vf Kimball Elevator Co., 854 p.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 
App. 1993). No deference is accorded to the trial court1s 
conclusion that the facts are not in dispute or to the trial 
courtfs legal conclusions based on those facts. Kitchen v. Cal Gas 
QSL^, 821 P.2d 458 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 879 P.2d 476 
(Utah 1994). Summary judgment is generally considered to be a 
drastic remedy which requires strict compliance with Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Timm v. Dewsnupr 851 P.2d 1178, 
1181 (Utah 1983). Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate 
only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Finding No Genuine Issue of Material 
Fact as to the Existence of an Express or an Implied 
Compensation Contract Between Mrs. Cook and Her Employer, 
Zions. 
In its Motion For Summary Judgment, Zions claimed it has no 
contract with its employee, Mrs. Cook. Zions stated in absolute 
terms that it "does not enter into any individual employment 
agreements with its employees and did not do so with respect to 
plaintiff." (R. at 65.) The trial court, adopting a misdirected 
employment-at-will analysis, agreed, ruling that 
The first cause of action for 'Breach of Express 
Employment Contract1 must be and the same is dismissed 
because there is no employment contract between the 
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parties. Utah law presumes that any employment contract 
with no specified term as to duration is an 'at-will1 
relationship. Berube v, Fashion Center, Ltflt, 771 p.2d 
1033, (Utah 1989). Nothing in evidence can be shown to 
have changed the initial 'at-will1 relationship. Even in 
cases where an 'at-will' employee has no right of action 
against its employer for breach of employment contract 
upon being discharged, (Brehany v. Nordstromf Inc.f 812 
P.2d 49 [Utah 1991]) in this case, since there has been 
no discharge, there exists an even stronger reason to 
disallow an [sic] suit for Breach of Contract. The 
Plaintiff remains employed yet wishes to maintain her 
lawsuit for breach of contract while going to work every 
day and continuing to receive employee benefits and 
income. 
R. at 478.) (Emphasis in original.) The trial court's analysis 
and conclusion were wrong. The fact that Mrs. Cook may be employed 
at-will is not relevant to her claims that Zions breached her 
contractual right to take time off work when necessary for illness 
or needed medical treatment. The central issue before the trial 
court and on appeal is whether a reasonable jury could find an 
employment contract for certain compensation, including, in part, 
the right to request and receive paid sick leave, regardless of 
whether that contract could be terminated by either party. 
A. Significant Facts in the Record Support Mrs. Cook's Claim 
That She Had a Contract for Compensation Which Included 
Paid Sick Leave. 
The claim that Mrs. Cook had an agreement with Zions to 
provide services in exchange for compensation was strongly 
supported by the evidence before the trial court and therefore 
should have been decided by the finder of fact. The record 
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demonstrates that Zions offered Mrs. Cook employment which she 
accepted in consideration for certain compensation and which 
included the ability and flexibility to take involuntary leaves of 
absence when needed for medical care. (R. at 251-52; 305; 332-33; 
437-39.) 
Prior to beginning employment, Zions informed Mrs. Cook that 
as part of her compensation, she would automatically earn credits 
for involuntary leaves of absence from work, and would therefore be 
entitled to a certain number of paid sick days. (R. at 437.) 
Based on the employment offer made by Zions1 representatives, which 
was memorialized by the Employment Agreement, Mrs. Cook accepted 
employment. (R. at 438; 441; Addendum ttB".) The flexibility which 
involuntary paid sick leave offered was a significant part of Mrs. 
Cook's compensation package, and was an important inducement to her 
in accepting Zions' employment offer. (R. at 438-39.) 
Since accepting Zions1 offer, Mrs. Cook has relied on its 
agreement to provide paid sick leave, and on several occasions, has 
used that sick leave. (R. at 251-52; 304-06; 308; 439.) Pay stubs 
given to Mrs. Cook by Zions regularly documented Zions1 policy of 
providing her earned sick leave which was treated as normal 
compensation, subject to withholdings, taxes, etc. (R. at 321; 326; 
351.) 
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Mrs. Cook's understanding from Zions' course of dealings, 
representations and practices, was that she would receive paid sick 
leave in partial consideration for her service to the bank. (R. at 
439.) Mrs. Cook's sick leave was not a mere gratuity; it was part 
of the bargained-for compensation she was to receive for the 
services she rendered. The evidence makes it clear that an express 
contract had been entered into by the parties# and moreover, that 
the contract had been performed and confirmed by their conduct 
through a course of dealing lasting several years. An integral 
part of that contract included Mrs. Cook's ability and flexibility 
to request and receive earned sick leave when needed. 
B. The Relationship Between an Employer and an Employee Is 
Contractual Regardless of Whether That Relationship Is 
Terminable At-Will. 
The trial court noted that Mrs. Cook and Zions have an "at-
will" relationship, and then somehow concluded that since Mrs. Cook 
had not been terminated, there could be no action for breach of 
contract. (R. at 478.) The concept of "employment at-will" does 
not, and has never meant that there is no employment contract 
between an employer and its employee; it simply means that the 
employment contract has no specific duration, and is terminable at 
the will of either party. The Supreme Court in Berube stated: "The 
at-will rule, after all, is merely a rule of contract construction 
and not a legal principle . . . The rule creates a presumption that 
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any employment contract which has no specified term of duration is 
an at-will relationship." Berubef 771 P.2d at 1044. (Emphasis 
added; internal citation omitted.) 
It belies the obvious to state that an employer and its 
employees have no contract. At the very least, employees report 
for work each day, in exchange for compensation.4 An employer-
employee relationship is necessarily based on an agreement that, in 
exchange for services rendered by the employee, the employer will 
timely pay wages and provide earned benefits. Whether the 
employment relationship is for a definite period or terminable at-
will, that obligation continues, unless modified by the parties, 
until the relationship is terminated. In Johnson v. Morton 
Thiokolf 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991), the Supreme Court stated that 
an employers promise of employment under certain terms 
and for an indefinite period constitutes both the terms 
of the employment contract and the employer's 
consideration for the employment contract. The 
employee's performance of service pursuant to the 
employer's offer constitutes both the employee's 
acceptance of the offer and the employee's consideration 
for the contract. 
Johnsonr 818 P.2d at 1002, siting Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, §21 
(1963). (Emphasis added.) 
4
 Seef e.g.r Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-21-1 and 34-28-1 et seg. 
(1994) which provide for attorneys' fees and other remedies in 
actions for compensation earned but not timely paid. 
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Zions1 claim that it had no contract with Mrs. Cook and that, 
therefore, her earned sick leave cannot be compensation pursuant to 
an employment contract, is contrary to both Utah law and general 
legal principles governing employment relationships. An employee's 
compensation is not necessarily limited to salary, but will include 
any other benefits that are an integral part of the employee's 
contemplated compensation. These benefits may include sick leave. 
Accord Auclair v. Allstate Ins. Co.
 f 392 A.2d 1193, 1196 (N.H. 
1978); Jeannont v. New Hampshire Personnel Comm'n/ 392 A.2d 1193, 
1196 (N.H. 1978) (sick leave benefits are an integral part of the 
contemplated compensation); Christian Y» County Of Ontario, 399 
N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (sick leave benefits are 
generally considered to be a part of an employeefs overall 
compensation); City of Orange v. Chancer 325 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1959) (the fact that a part of an employee's compensation 
is called "sick leave" is of no material fact); Vangilder v. City 
of Jacksonf 492 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Mo Ct. App. 1973) (sick leave 
benefits are generally considered to be a part of the employees 
overall compensation, earned during the period of his employment 
and forming a part of his employment contract); and Logue v. City 
of Carthage, 612 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (sick leave 
benefits are to be considered compensation for services and are not 
to be viewed as a bonus or an arbitrary award) . Thus, even 
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assuming Mrs. Cook is employed at-willf her earned sick leave 
benefit is not a mere gratuity, but constitute compensation for the 
services she has rendered. 
C. Mrs. Cook's Express Contract Could Also Be Viewed as an 
Implied Contract Created by the Parties1 Course of 
Dealings. 
Zions1 position is that an employer's long history of 
providing compensation, including the benefit of sick leave, in 
consideration for services performed by an employee could not, as 
a matter of law, create an implied contract requiring compensation 
for the services previously performed. Specifically, Zions argues 
that *[b]ecause plaintiff's implied-in-fact contract claim does not 
involve termination issues, her cause of action is not recognized 
under Utah law and must be dismissed." (R. at 71) .5 Zions undertook 
an extensive effort to cite employment-at-will and wrongful 
termination cases to the trial court. (R. at 71; 393-98.) By so 
doing, Zions has confused the nature of Mrs. Cook's claims and 
5
 As set forth on pages 17-18 supra, the "at-will" nature of 
Mrs. Cook's employment with Zions simply means that her employment 
contract does not have a specific duration. To allege that because 
this case does not involve termination issues, she therefore has no 
contract, either express or implied, is patently incorrect and 
misleading. Situations of employment at-will are simply 
u
employment contracts [that] are terminable at the will of either 
party . . . ". Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action Program, 
775 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah App. , 1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1990). (Emphasis added.) Since neither Zions nor Mrs. Cook 
sought to terminate her employment before the contract breach 
occurred, the "at-will" nature of that employment contract is 
irrelevant. 
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obtained a ruling which would, if affirmed, eliminate an employer's 
obligation to pay and otherwise compensate its employees after the 
employees have performed their assigned duties in reliance on the 
employees promise of compensation. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Berube specifically held that the 
parties1 course of dealing may establish an implied contractual 
term, stating that "[t]he conclusion that [an implied in fact] 
promise exists may arise from a variety of sources, including the 
conduct of the parties, announced personnel policies, practices of 
that particular trade or industry, or other circumstances which 
show the existence of such a promise." Berubef 771 P.2d at 1044. 
Berube further held that "continued performance of the employeefs 
duties is adequate consideration for . . . an implied contract 
provision." Berube
 f 771 P. 2d at 1044. In addition to the 
Employment Agreement and Zions express representations, all of the 
possible sources of an implied contract listed in Berube exist in 
the instant case. 
These facts demonstrate that the parties agreed that the 
ability to take paid sick leave, when needed and as accrued, was 
part of the compensation agreed to be provided to Mrs. Cook in 
connection with her employment with Zions. 
This Court has defined an implied contract as "a tacit 
promise, one that is inferred in whole or in part from expressions 
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other than words on the part of the promisor." Allstate Enter.
 f 
Inc. v. Hertfordf 772 P.2d 466, 468 (Utah App. 1989) (Citing. 
Corbinf supra at §§ 17 and 38). Even assuming, arguendo, that the 
document referred to herein as the Employment Agreement is not a 
binding written agreement between the parties, it is at the very 
least evidence of a tacit agreement between the parties concerning 
compensation in the form of paid sick leave. This Court held in 
Piston v. EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc., 893 P. 2d 1071, 1075 
(Utah App. 1995) , that "the lack of a written agreement does not 
mean that there was no enforceable agreement." 
Addressing the issue of implied contracts in general, this 
Court has defined the 
elements of such a contract as being: (1) the defendant 
requested the plaintiff to perform work; (2) the 
plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate him or her 
for those services; and (3) the defendant knew or should 
have known that the plaintiff expected compensation. See 
Kintz v. Read, 626 P.2d 52, 55 (Wash. App. 1981); See 
alSQ Restatement (Second) of Contracts Sec. 5 comment (a) 
(1981) (providing that terms of promise or agreement are 
those expressed in language of parties or implied in fact 
from other conduct). 
Davies v. Olsonf 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah App. 1987). In reliance 
on Zions1 employment offer, Mrs. Cook worked for several years 
accruing sick leave and receiving it when needed, until February, 
1994. Throughout her employment, Zions has maintained an 
accounting of the amount of involuntary sick leave which Mrs. Cook 
accrued and used. These facts and all inferences therefrom, 
22 
construed in Mrs. Cook's favor, demonstrate the existence of an 
implied contract under the standard set forth in Pavies. 
D. Whether or Not a Term of Compensation Represents a 
Contractual Right Between an Employer and an Employee 
Depends on Whether That Term Is Definite. 
"The requirement that a contract be sufficiently definite is 
a functional requirement from the parties1 perspective in terms of 
whether it can be performed, and from the courts1 perspective in 
terms of whether it can be enforced." Pistonf 893 P.2d at 1075 
(holding that an oral agreement for compensation evidenced in part 
by a letter of intent was reached and therefore enforceable between 
the parties.) In this case, the contract term providing for paid 
sick leave was functionally definite because it was performed by 
the parties for several years until February, 1994. Zions has 
admitted that its employees earn sick leave as part of their 
compensation (R. at 332-33); and that full time employees earn the 
right to use sick leave and can accumulate eight hours a month for 
a maximum of twelve days a year. (R. at 325; 334; 344.) In Mrs. 
Cooks1 case, at the beginning of 1994, she had 249.76 hours of 
unused and available sick leave. (R. at 336-37.) The agreement 
providing for earned sick leave was definite and understood by the 
parties, and was in fact performed by them for many years. 
The second requirement set forth in Piston relates to 
enforceability. In Piston this Court cited with approval Bunnell 
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v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 86, 368 P. 2d 597, 600 (1962), where the 
Utah Supreme Court held that "a contract can be enforced by the 
courts only if the obligations of the parties are set forth with 
sufficient definiteness that it can be performed." Piston also 
cited the Restatement supra at § 33, which provides that a[t]he 
terms of the contract are reasonably certain if they provide a 
basis of determining the existence of a breach and for giving an 
appropriate remedy." Piston 893 P. 2d at 1075-76. Thus, as long 
as the agreement is definite enough to allow the finder of fact to 
determine whether one party has breached it, and to award some kind 
of reasonable damages to the wronged party, the contract is not 
void for indefiniteness.6 Therefore, the contract for compensation 
between Mrs. Cook and Zions is enforceable because, in addition to 
being performable, the obligation of the parties was sufficiently 
definite for the trier of fact to determine its terms, the 
existence of a breach and an appropriate remedy. 
1. Zions Breached a Definite Agreement with Mrs. 
Cook Which Allowed Her to Request and Use Sick 
Leave When Needed. 
6
 "Once a defendant has been shown to have caused a loss, he 
should not be allowed to escape liability because the amount of the 
loss cannot be proved with precision . . . Consequently, the 
reasonable level of certainty required to establish the amount of 
a loss is generally lower than that required to establish the fact 
or cause of a loss." Cook Assoc.
 r Inc. v. Warnickf 664 P.2d 1161, 
1166 (Utah 1983) (Internal citations omitted.) 
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In order to determine the existence of a breach and an 
appropriate remedy, it is crucial to understand what was actually 
bargained for by the parties* Mrs. Cook entered into her 
employment with Zions in part because of the flexibility offered by 
paid sick leave. This was a significant part of Mrs. Cook's 
compensation package, and was an important inducement to her. (R. 
at 438.) In fact, Mrs. Cook was willing to work at an hourly rate 
lower than what she received from her former employer because 
Zions* compensation package included paid sick leave. (R. at 438-
39.) Because paid sick leave and the ability to use it when needed 
is of great value to its employees, Zions, like many other 
employers, offers its employees paid sick leave in order to be 
competitive and to promote the health of its employees. (R. at 
325.) 
Zions clearly knew the importance of sick leave as it related 
to Mrs. Cook's health when it offered her employment. Ms. Misdom, 
an officer of the bank and the representative who signed Mrs. 
Cook's Employment Agreement, testified as follows: 
Q. So, the bank's sick day or short leave of absence 
policy is designed, is it not, to be used by employees 
who need to schedule medical treatment? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the purpose of allowing them to be able to 
schedule medical treatment would be so they can resolve 
medical problems before they become more serious? 
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MS. BAAR: Objection, assumes facts not in evidence. 
MR. HOOLE: Let's let her answer the question. 
THE WITNESS: I would think so, yes. 
Q. (By Mr. Hoole) In any event, as a supervisor, would 
it be your practice to allow your subordinates time off 
if they needed medical care in order to avoid a situation 
becoming more serious? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And would you use the bank's policy for that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it your understanding that that's what the policy is 
A. Yes. 
• • • 
Q. Okay. Is it your understanding that if an employee 
is not allowed time off for medical care that the 
employee['s] situation may become more serious? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Potentially life-threatening? 
MS. BAAR: Objection. Same objection. 
THE WITNESS: Potentially it could be. 
Q. (By Mr. Hoole) In any event, the policy is designed 
to prevent that type of thing from happening? 
MS. BAAR: Same objection. Also, lack of foundation. 
THE WITNESS: I would think so, yes. 
at 471-72.) 
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In the Employment Agreement, Zions described sick leave as 
"Involuntary".7 (R. at 441; Addendum "B".) This indicates Zions1 
intent to grant Mrs. Cook the right to request and receive sick 
leave when required. Mrs. Cookfs ability to request time off for 
medical care was the very essence of Zions1 sick leave policy and 
the bargain between the parties. A breach of contract is 
nonperformance of a legal duty when due under a contract. 
Restatement, supra at § 235(2). Obviously, sick leave, once 
earned, is due when an employee is sick or in need of medical care. 
In this case, what was bargained for and agreed by the parties 
was the ability to receive sick leave when needed. When Zions 
prevented Mrs. Cook from taking one day off work through most of 
February, March, April and May of 1994 in order to have a lump on 
her lip removed and biopsied it breached a performable and 
enforceable term of her employment compensation agreement. Given 
the performability of Mrs. Cook's compensation agreement, Zions1 
breach, and the trial courtfs ability to enforce the contact, the 
issue becomes whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed in the 
law, could determine an appropriate remedy. 
7
 Webster's New World Dictionary defines "involuntary" as: "a) 
not done of one's own free will; not done by choice; b) 
unintentional; accidental; c) not consciously controlled; 
automatic." Webster's New World Dictionary, 742 (2d College Ed., 
1984.) The word "involuntary" in this context, strongly suggests 
the right to request and use sick leave when needed. 
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2. Mrs. Cook Is Entitled to an Appropriate Remedy 
Based on Those Damages Reasonably Foreseeable 
or Within the Reasonable Contemplation of the 
Parties at the Time They Entered into the 
Employment Compensation Contract. 
In reliance on Beck v, Farmers Ins, Excht, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1985), the Utah Supreme Court in Berubef 771 P.2d at 1050, stated 
that plaintiffs who prevail in employment cases may recover damages 
for general and consequential injuries resulting from the breach of 
an employment contract. Berube further stated that 
[b]oth general and consequential damages are available 
for contract breaches, and consequential damages are 
•those reasonably within the contemplation of, or 
reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the 
contract was made.1 Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.
 r 701 P. 
2d at 801. Of course, • [t]he foreseeability of any such 
damages will always hinge upon the nature and language of 
the contract and the reasonable expectations of the 
parties.1 Id. (Citing J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts 
§ 14-5, at 523-25 (2d ed. 1977.)) 
Berube, 771 P.2d at 1050. 
This Court, in Heslop Vt Bank Of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840 (Utah 
App. 1992) , noted that "Bsck envisioned a broad range of 
recoverable damages for breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing in a first-party insurance contract.[8] Similarly, 
8
 In Beckf the Supreme Court held that a[a]lthough the policy 
limits define the amount for which the insurer may be held 
responsible in performing the contract, they do not define the 
amount for which it may be liable upon a breach." Beckf 701 P.2d at 
801. Accordingly, the Court noted that 
[i]n an action for breach of a duty to bargain in good 
faith, a broad range of recoverable damages is 
conceivable, particularly given the unique nature and 
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Berube envisioned a broad range of recoverable damages in an 
implied-in-fact contract of employment . . .". Heslop, 839 P.2d at 
840. In Heslop this Court reasoned that a[t]erminated employees, 
like injured insurance claimants, find themselves in a particularly 
vulnerable position once the employer breaches the employment 
agreement."9 Heslopf 839 P.2d at 840. This same reasoning should 
apply in this instance where Zions breached its contractual duty by 
not allowing Mrs. Cook one day off for a surgical procedure, thus 
putting her in the dilemma of obtaining the requested medical 
treatment only if she were willing to risk losing her employment 
and health insurance. Zions has admitted that the purpose of 
allowing employees time off work for medical procedures is to help 
its employees obtain necessary medical attention, diagnosis and 
purpose of an insurance contract. An insured frequently 
faces catastrophic consequences if funds are not 
available within a reasonable period of time to cover an 
insured loss; damages for losses well in excess of the 
policy limits, such as for a home or a business, may 
therefore be foreseeable and provable. 
Beckr 701 P.2d at 802. The Court further found "no difficulty with 
the proposition that, in unusual cases, damages for mental anguish 
might [also] be provable." 3&£&, 701 P.2d at 802. As a result of 
Zions1 denying Mrs. Cook's requests for time off for necessary 
medical treatment, Mrs. Cook has suffered emotional distress, 
marked changes in her normal life and is currently in a struggle to 
save her life. (R. at 254.) 
9
 There is no reason why Berube's analysis of consequential 
damages for breaches of implied-in-fact contracts should not be 
equally applicable in the context of express employment agreements. 
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treatment before health problems become serious or life 
threatening. (R. at 325; 471-472.) Jury questions therefore exist 
on the issues of whether there is a contract, whether that contract 
was breached, and what are the foreseeable general and 
consequential damages flowing from that breach. 
E. Zions Cannot Retroactively Disclaim Mrs. Cook's Earned 
Compensation. 
Zions has taken the position that any employment agreement 
between it and Mrs. Cook relating to compensation was retroactively 
disclaimed by an employee handbook. Zions states that 
the handbook clearly and conspicuously states that 
employees should understand that neither party has 
entered into any employment contract, express or implied 
. . . By [the words of this disclaimer], Zions clearly 
disclaimed any intent to enter into an express or implied 
employment contract with its employees. Under these 
circumstances, no contract could exist. 
(R. at 400-01.) However, Zions1 disclaimer argument is fatally 
flawed. It is undisputed that Mrs. Cook did not receive any 
handbook until April 8, 1994. (R. at 251; 306.) A copy of the 
Employee Handbook Signature page, signed by Mrs. Cook and dated 
April 8, 1994, is attached hereto as Addendum "D". (R. at 346.) 
In Hamilton v. Parkdale Care Centerf Inc.r75 Utah Adv. Rep. 
32 (Utah App. October 12, 1995) (a wrongful termination case where, 
at the commencement of employment, the employee received and 
acknowledged a copy of the employerfs handbook and at-will 
disclaimer), this Court observed that "Utah courts have held that 
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a clear and conspicuous disclaimer in an employee handbook negates 
an employee's contention that the employment relationship is other 
than at will." Hamilton, 275 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33. Although 
Hamilton was an at-will case, it is instructive here. 
First, since no handbook was given to Mrs. Cook until April 8, 
1994, no disclaimer could have been "clear or conspicuous", as 
required by Hamiltonr before that time.10 By April 8, 1994, Mrs. 
Cook's requests for sick leave had already been repeatedly denied. 
Therefore, any disclaimer in the handbook is irrelevant. 
Second, Zions' disclaimer claim is fundamentally unfair and 
without merit. Zions, through its handbook, cannot retroactively 
disclaim earned compensation, nor should it be able to change, 
disclaim or revoke sick leave after it has vested and been 
requested. In Loguef the Missouri Court of Appeals held that an 
employer's act of changing the terms of its sick leave policy could 
not act to strip an employee of the benefits which had accrued to 
him prior to such alteration. Loguer 612 S.W.2d at 151. Here the 
10
 The trial court ignored the requirement that a disclaimer 
be conspicuous, and stated that although she did not know and was 
not aware of the disclaimer, Mrs. Cook was nevertheless somehow 
charged with knowledge of its contents, stating that w[e]ven though 
Ms. Cook denies receiving the handbook until April 8# 1994 she 
certainly knows before receipt and after that such a book contains 
only 'guidelines' for company and employee relations and 
expectations and cannot be construed to create greater contractual 
liability." (Citation and footnote omitted; Emphasis added) (R. at 
479.) 
31 
record is clear that Zions has never even attempted to change the 
terms of Mrs. Cook's sick leave. (R. at 250-51; 304.) The 
handbook's statement of Zions1 sick leave policy, rather than 
changing that policy, simply confirms the compensation agreement 
and practices Mrs. Cook had already relied on for six years. (R. 
at 116-17.) Moreover, the Employment Agreement states that only 
*[u]pon termination of employment [will sick leave] . . benefits . 
. . be forfeited." (R. at 441; Addendum "B\) 
Third, any purported disclaimer in an employment manual is 
ineffective in retroactively refuting the essence of the employment 
relationship itself, i.e., the existence of a contract related to 
compensation for services rendered. As stated in Kirberg v. West 
One Bankf 872 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah App. 1994), disclaimers can be 
modified by an expressed or implied agreement. See Perry v. 
Sindermannf 408 U.S. 593, 603, (1972) (employer's de facto and 
written policies may create an employment contract even where a 
policy manual states the contrary). Agreements regarding an 
employee's compensation are not the types of promises an employer 
should be able to retroactively disclaim. Nevertheless, a review 
of the handbook disclaimer, (R. at 106), shows that what Zions is 
attempting to avoid is an employee's ability to rebut the at-will 
presumption, not an employee's right to receive compensation. 
32 
Zions1 claim that the handbook disclaimer allows it to void 
all of its obligations to its employees would operate as a fraud 
upon the employees. Once Mrs. Cook earned and accrued sick leave 
by performing her duties as an employee of Zions, Zions cannot deny 
her that compensation under the guise of an "at-will" disclaimer. 
Nor could Zions rely on that disclaimer to refuse to give an 
employee earned salary, health insurance, life insurance, vacation 
pay# pension funds, or any other form of compensation, once that 
compensation is due to an employee. The at-will nature of 
employment allows an employer to prospectively change the terms of 
that employment, or to terminate the relationship altogether, but 
it does not allow an employer to deny compensation already due. 
III. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exists Within the 
Confines of All Contracts, Including Employment Compensation 
Agreements• 
Zions argued to the trial court that "in the employment 
context, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not 
recognized under Utah law." (R. at 71.) To support this 
representation, Zions cited three cases: Brehanyf 812 P.2d at 49; 
Heslopr 839 P.2d at 828; and Loose v. Nature-All Corp.P 785 P.2d 
1096 (Utah 1989). Notwithstanding Zions1 misstatement of the law, 
both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have held that the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does exist within the 
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confines of all contracts, including employment contracts. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Heslopr citing Brehany which in turn cited 
Loose, stated that "every contract is subject to an implied 
covenant of good faith." Heslopf 839 P.2d at 840 (Emphasis added). 
In Dubois v. Grand Centralr 872 P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 1994), citing 
Heslop and Brehanyf this Court specifically stated that *[n]one of 
these cases have held that there is not an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in either at-will or other sorts of 
employment contracts." Duboisf 872 P.2d at 1078. The Dubois court 
clearly reaffirmed the concept that the "implied covenant [of good 
faith and fair dealing] protects an employee from denial of rights 
under the contract . . . w. Duboisf 872 P.2d at 1078-79.** 
The cases cited by Zions simply provide that the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not limit an 
employer's right to terminate an otherwise at-will employee, not 
that the implied covenant of good faith does not exist. Zions 
misconstrued Brehanyf He1sop and Loose as extinguishing any implied 
11
 see e.g Qiympus Hills Center, Ltdt v» Smith's Food/ 889 
P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1994, cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) 
and the cases cited therein. 
12
 Zions would have us believe that this Court in Dubois was 
unable to interpret the relevant decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court, arguing that the Dubois opinion must "give way to the higher 
authority of the Supreme Court." (R. at 404.) However, it is 
clear that Dubois and the Utah Supreme Court's decision cited 
therein are consistent in holding that the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing exists in all contracts. 
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covenant of good faith in the employment context may have misled 
the trial court. 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises because 
"contracting parties, hard as they may try# cannot reduce every 
understanding to a stated term." Olympus Hillsr 889 P.2d at 450. 
Therefore, "[t]he good faith question often arises because a 
contract is an exchange expressed imperfectly and projected into an 
uncertain future. Contract parties rely on the good faith of their 
exchange partners because detailed planning may be ineffectual or 
inadvisable." Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common 
Law Duty to Perform in Good Faithr 94 Har. L.Rev. 369, 371 (1980). 
Although the covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists 
within every contract, the Heslop decision correctly held that the 
"covenant cannot be construed fto establish new, independent rights 
or duties not agreed upon by the parties.1" Heslopr 839 P.2d at 
840, citing Brehanyf 812 P.2d at 55. Mrs. Cook has not sought to 
use the implied covenant of good faith to establish new, 
independent contractual rights or duties. Her claim is that Zions 
has violated its obligation of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance of her employment agreement by repeatedly denying 
necessary time off for diagnostic medical treatment. 
Because Zions requires its employees to notify their 
departmental supervisors of the need to take sick leave for medical 
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procedures, (R. at 221), and requires them to obtain approval 
before they can schedule medical treatment, (R. at 344; 471-72)# 
Zions has reserved for itself, rightly or wrongly, limited 
discretion to approve sick leave. To the extent Zions exercised 
discretion by denying Mrs. Cook sick leave, it had an obligation to 
do so in good faith, for the covenant of good faith limits "the 
exercise of discretion in performance conferred on one party by the 
contract." Burton, supra, at 372-73. The covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing may thus "be used to protect a 'weaker1 party from 
a 'stronger1 party." Burton, supra, at 383.13 
Although Zions did require Mrs. Cook to obtain approval before 
taking time off for scheduled medical treatment, (R. at 344; 471-
72) , the limit of its discretion in denying her requests was 
clearly set forth in its Newsbreak statement: "Zions policies 
provide employees with adequate time to seek needed medical 
treatment." (R. at 349; Addendum "C".) (Emphasis added.) In this 
statement, Zions1 has admitted that it should have allowed Mrs. 
Cook "adequate time to seek needed medical treatment", but despite 
her repeated requests, unfortunately did not. Therefore, a trier 
13
 The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is mutual. 
Just as employees could abuse their right to sick leave and lose 
their employment, conversely, an employer could abuse its 
discretion by denying sick leave to the injury of its employee, for 
which the employer would be liable under the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
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of fact could find that Zions acted in a manner that, by its own 
standard, violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
IV. The Trial Court Erred By Not Finding Genuine Issues of 
Material Fact as to Zions' Performance under the Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
Mrs. Cook claims that Zions acted in bad faith by preventing 
her from using one day of her earned sick leave for nearly four 
months. This Court has held that "good faith and fair dealing are 
fact sensitive concepts, and whether there has been a breach of 
good faith and fair dealing is a factual issue, generally 
inappropriate for decision as a matter of law." Republicf 883 P.2d 
at 281. See also Western Farm Credit Bank v, Pratt/ 860 p.2d 376, 
380 (Utah App. 1993), cert. denied, 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 
1994)(whether a party has breached the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is generally a factual issue to be determined by the 
fact finder, not an issue subject to resolution as matter of law) ; 
Corbin, supra at § 654B (if a dispute exists concerning a duty of 
good faith as to why contractual parties did what they did, there 
is a question of fact for the fact finder). Whether Zions did in 
fact breach its duty under the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is a factual issue which should be decided by a trier of 
fact. 
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V. The Trial Court Erred by Resolving Factual Disputes Against 
Mrs. Cook and by Relying on Issues Neither Raised by Zions Nor 
Properly Considered in a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
A. The Trial Court Failed Use a Proper Rule 56 Analysis. 
The Tenth Circuit, consistent with Utah law, has held that 
[w]hen applying [the Rule 56(c)] standard, we examine the 
factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment. [Citation omitted.] If there is no genuine 
issue of material fact in dispute, then we next determine 
if the substantive law was correctly applied by the 
district court. 
Hirase-Doi v, UtSt West Communications, Inct, 61 F.3d 777, 781 
(10th Cir. 1995).14 The trial court did not apply this standard. 
Rather than deciding whether factual issues exist as to the 
formation and performance of the contract under the Rule 56 
standard, the trial court erred by construing facts against Mrs. 
Cook, and then using those misconstrued facts to draw invalid legal 
conclusions. For example, in its Memorandum Decision, the trial 
court held that Mrs Cookfs "claim that she was denied the 
opportunity to utilize her accrued sick leave is without 
verification in the facts." (R. at 479.) The trial court made 
14
 Reference to federal cases and the federal advisory 
committee notes is pertinent to give meaning and effect to the 
Utah rules. Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 1993). When 
interpreting the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah courts will 
look to the express language of the Utah Rules and, to the extent 
that they are similarly worded, to the Federal Rules and cases 
interpreting them. First Security Bank of Utah Nat'l Ass'n v. 
Conlinr 817 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1991). 
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this conclusion notwithstanding the obvious factual dispute 
involving Mrs. Cook's claims that she made several requests for 
time off which were denied, and Zions' claim that no such requests 
or denials ever occurred. The trial court clearly interpreted 
facts against Mrs. Cook, instead of in her favor. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Raising the Issue of Mitigation 
of Damages. 
Without specifically ruling on the issue of mitigation of 
damages, the trial court's decision seems to rely on Mrs. Cook's 
"failure" to take the day off without her supervisor's permission. 
(R. at 480.) The record indicates that Mrs. Cook's delay in 
seeking medical treatment was not voluntary. She feared that she 
would be terminated in accordance with Zions' policies if she 
blatantly disregarded her supervisor's directive to remain at work 
during a period of time when her workload was exceptionally heavy. 
Not knowing whether she had a medical problem, Mrs. Cook acted 
reasonably under the circumstances by maintaining her employment 
and insurance while continuing to make requests for time off. 
In ruling that Mrs. Cook should simply have refused to delay 
her surgery, the trial court made a factual determination that she 
failed to mitigate the damages caused by Zions' breach. The issue 
of mitigation of damages was improperly considered by the trial 
court, because not only is mitigation a factual question, it was 
not raised by Zions in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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It is well settled that a *[p]laintiff 's duty to make 
reasonable efforts to mitigate damages does not extend to 
subjecting oneself to undue risk and expense . . . whether efforts 
were reasonable or potential risk and expense were undue are 
questions of fact . . .M. Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs,, 822 
P.2d 455, 460 (Alaska 1991) (Citations omitted). See alsor Massey 
Ferguson, Inc. v. Stower 686 P.2d 604 (Wyo 1984). Accord Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.f776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989) (financial burden 
can be an excuse for failure to.mitigate); Mildon v. Bybeef 375 
P.2d 458, 461 (Utah 1962) ("the objective commercial reasonableness 
of mitigation efforts is a fact question . . ..") 
Finally, Mrs. Cook has not been deposed nor allowed the 
opportunity to testify. Therefore, the facts related to mitigation 
are not yet fully known and should not have considered below. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Cook has alleged that she bargained for, and entered into 
an agreement with Zions which allowed her paid sick leave when 
needed. Zions has denied that they made any agreement, express or 
implied. The trial court, instead of construing the facts 
indicating the existence of an express or implied agreement in 
favor of Mrs. Cook, relied on the at-will nature of their 
relationship and ruled that no employment agreement existed as a 
matter of law. The court further found that the implied covenant 
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of good faith and fair dealing does not exist within employment 
compensation contracts. 
Construing all facts, and all inferences in favor of Mrs. 
Cook, there is ample evidence for a reasonable jury to find that 
the parties entered into a binding agreement concerning 
compensation which was breached in bad faith, causing damages. 
Therefore, Zions was not entitled to summary judgment. The judgment 
granted in Zions1 favor must be overturned and this case remanded 
for a determination of factual issues. 
DATED this 27th day of November, 1995. 
HOOLE & KING, L.C. 
/ , )i9*i i-i. / y . A ^ 
'-SOGER H./ HOOLE ' 
PAUL M./KING 
HEATHER/E. MORRISON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 27th day of November, 1995, 
four copies of the foregoing were hand-delivered to the following: 
Lois A. Baar 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Tab A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
m AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GINA COOK 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
CASE # 940905799 
This matter came before the Court on a second oral Argument of Counsel as to the 
Defendant's "Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Court Proceedings or in the Alternative 
for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Case." The matter was first argued March 10, 
1995 but due to the Court's lengthy calendar on that date, Counsel for plaintiff was 
concerned as to the adequacy of time to present the Plaintiffs position and also thereafter 
was concerned that they needed to provide the Court with supplemental material. The matter 
was set for further argument April 21, 1994 , at 9:00 A.M. The Plaintiff was represented by 
Roger Hoole, who argued the case, and by Heather Morrison and Paul King. The Defendant 
was represented by Lois Baar, who argued the case, and Michael Zody. 
The Court heart the arguments of Counsel, took the matter under advisement, and 
herein renders its 
MEMORANDUM DECISION. 
The single issue in the case is whether there is a legal basis for the Plaintiff to blame 
Zions Bank for the consequences of the Plaintiff not obtaining a medical day off as 
authorized by the Bank's medical leave policy and as accrued to the Plaintiff through her 
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length of employment. Ms. Cook claims the bank failed to allow her time for medical leave 
for surgery to remove and biopsy a growth in her lip. The bank disputes it. 
The factual setting is as follows: 
1. Plaintiff was employed by Zions bank in May of 1988 at a rate of $6.00 per 
hour. She has thereafter received appropriate increases in compensation. 
2. While Plaintiff was initially a part-time employee, she later accepted full-time 
employment. She was entitled to accrue for medical absence, while working part-time at 
over twenty (20) hours per week, one-half (1/2) day per month; and, while working full-time 
she accrued one (1) day per month. There is no dispute she had accrued sufficient time to 
cover her absence for the surgery. 
3. Plaintiff was hired as an "at-will" employee and remains employed at this 
time. 
4. On January 29, 1994, Plaintiff requested and was authorized to take "...one 
hour of time off" to visit her doctor on February 1, 1994 to have "...the lump on my lip 
removed."1 
5. The time was granted, the appointment was met, but the Doctor "...decided 
1
 See the Affidavit of Gina Cook signed January 20, 1995, and Exhibit 12 attached to 
"Plainfiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment." The 
court notes that on Exhibit 12 was the further authorization to see Dr. Griffith regarding an 
allergy appointment apparently scheduled and rescheduled by the plaintiff. The combined 
appointments occupied the time from 8:30 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. 
[2] 
that the procedure would take a full day and would need to be done in a hospital." 
6. Ms. Cook returned to work and requested a "...full day off for surgery." 
7. Ms. Cook claims she was denied that time off due to the heavy work 
requirements imposed upon her and her department during the first few months of 1994. In 
fact she states that she asked for additional help in the department and a reduction of the 
"overtime" requested but each request was denied by the bank. 
8. Ms. Cook alleges she made further requests for the medical leave which 
requests were denied. 
9. On May 20, 1994, the surgery was scheduled, the growth was removed and a 
biopsy was performed. 
10. On May 31, 1994 the biopsy revealed "...a form of aggressive, malignant 
melanoma." 
11. On June 2, 1994 a second surgery was performed requiring removal of 
additional portions of flesh on Ms. Cook's chin and lower lip. 
12. Ms. Cook remained off work for ten and one-half (10 1/2) weeks thereafter 
from May 31, 1994 through August 8, 1994. 
13. Apparently Ms. Cook's entire absence was compensated and she remains 
employed to this date. The surgery has not seemed to resolve the difficulties and Ms. Cook 
may now be facing a terminal illness. 
Zions Bank, relevant to its "Motion.. .for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs 
[3] 
Complaint,"2 alleges the following facts: 
1. Plaintiff was employed in May of 1988 and Zions does not enter into any 
individual employment agreements with its employees and did not do so with Ms. Cook. 
2. In February of 1994 Zions issued a "handbook" containing the company policy 
guidelines regarding attendance, short term absences, and long term absences. The handbook 
contains a disclaimer as to creating any express or implied obligations for either the Bank or 
its employees. 
3. The handbook advises employees that they are hired as, and remain "at will" 
employees. 
4. The handbook contains some of the "...policies, procedures, benefits and other 
pertinent information..." to "...serve as a valuable reference"3 to employees. 
Ms. Cook's "Complaint (Jury Trial Demanded)" alleges the following Counts: 
1. Breach of Express Employment Contract. 
2. Breach of Implied-In-Fact Employment Contract. 
3. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
2
 The motion was titled, "Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Court Proceedings or in 
the Alternative for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Case." The request to compel 
arbitration was withdrawn March 10, 1995 at the initial oral argument on the matter. 
3
 see Exhibit A to defendant's "Memorandum in support of Motion to Compel Arbitration 
and Stay Court Proceedings or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs 
Case." 
[4] 
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4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds and rules as follows: 
1. The first cause of action for "Breach of Express Employment Contract" must 
be and the same is dismissed because there is no employment contract between the parties. 
Utah law presumes that any employment contract with no specified term as to duration is an 
"at-will" relationship. Berube v. Fashion Center. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, (Utah 1989) 
Nothing in evidence can be shown to have changed the initial "at-will" relationship. Even 
in cases where an "at-will" employee has no right of action against its employer for breach 
of employment contract upon being discharged. (Brehanv v. Nordstrom. Inc.. 812 P.2d 49 
[Utah 1991]) in this case, since there has been no discharge, there exists an even stronger 
reason to disallow an suit for Breach of Contract. The Plaintiff remains employed yet wishes 
to maintain her lawsuit for breach of contract while going to work every day and continuing 
to receive employee benefits and income. 
2. The second cause of action for "Breach of Implied-in-Fact Employment 
Contract" must be and the same is dismissed because the basis for such a claim is too remote 
and speculative to give rise to a contractual agreement. 
Within the company "handbook" is contained the statement, "This booklet is not 
intended to be an official policies and procedures manual, nor is it intended to create any 
express or implied contractual obligations on the part of Zions Bancorporation or its 
employees." 
[5] 
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The court can see no basis to claim that assurances were made to Ms. Cook to cause 
her to change her understanding as to her "at-will" employment. Even though Ms. Cook 
denies receiving the handbook until April 8, 19944 she certainly knows before receipt and 
after that such a book contains only "guidelines" for company and employee relations and 
expectations and cannot be construed to create greater contractual liability. (See Hodgson v. 
Bunzl Utah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331, [Utah 1992]) 
In addition, there can be no cause of action when the employee remains, as she does 
here, employed by the Bank. The cases of Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1989) and Kirberg v. West One Bank. 872 P.2d 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) each relate 
to claims associated with termination which has not occurred in this case. It seems 
particularly distasteful to allow an employer and employee to be in litigation with each other 
while they must continue to work together daily. Perhaps that is, in part, the reason that 
other agencies deal with such work related claims as Workmen's Compensation, etc. 
3. The third cause of action for "Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing" must be and the same is herein dismissed. The Plaintiffs claim that she was 
denied the opportunity to utilize her accrued sick leave is without verification in the facts. 
She received ten and one-half (10 1/2) weeks paid leave when the second surgery was 
4
 Affidavit of Gina Cook paragraph 8 states, ".. .1 was not given a copy of said employment 
handbook until April 8, 1994, nor did I ever receive a copy of any earlier employee handbook. 
The Employee Handbook was received and the Signature Page was signed by me on April 8, 
1994." 
[6] 
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performed June 2, 1994. The seeming basis of her claim is that she was asked by the bank 
to delay the surgery due to pressures at work. She simply could have refused to do so. She 
could simply have set the surgery earlier, informed her supervisor she was taking the time 
off, for the surgery and then done so. Had the bank terminated her for such a request, the 
case would be quite different. Can or should an employer, when both the employer and 
employee are admittedly unaware of the gravity of the employee's health, be subject to suit 
for failing to deal fairly and in good faith when the employee requests time for medical care? 
The employee bears the primary responsibility to know and understand her own health. She 
knew her family medical history and the occurrences of cancer therein. The fact that she 
allowed herself to delay the surgery cannot now be the responsibility of her employer. No 
one denied her any claims made...indeed, her only present claim is they denied her request 
for time off to attend the surgery. The facts of the case don't support that denial just 
because she did not schedule the surgery until May 20, 1994. 
4. The fourth cause of action for "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress" 
cannot lie before this court but must be a part of an action, if any, under Workmen's 
Compensation. Mounteer v. Utah Power and Light Company. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991) 
Employers are shielded from liability for work related injuries unless their conduct was 
intended in some way to be injurious. In this case, since neither the employer nor the 
employee knew of the gravity of the medical condition, it cannot be contended that the 
employer knew of and/or intended the "injurious act." Lantz v. National Semiconductor 
[7] 
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Corp.. 775 P.2d 937, (Utah App. 1989) The earliest anyone knew of the "malignant 
melanoma" was May 31, 1994. 
The Plaintiffs present medical condition is tragic and can only cause one to feel 
empathy and compassion. Unfortunately, it was she or her physician who should have acted 
sooner.. .not her employer. An employer is entitled to say that the demands of work are 
busy and that they need help...and employees are entitled to say that their medical needs pre-
empt the employers work, and then schedule their appointments appropriately. Had that 
occurred this case would not be before the court. 
Ms. Baar is requested to prepare an order consistent herewith and with her pleadings 
on file herein. If other facts or law are deemed appropriate for inclusion, consistent 
herewith, they may be presented. 
Dated, June 8, 1995. 
[8] 
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ZIONS BANCORPORATION and SUBSIDIARIES 
Employment Benefits Disclosure and Pay Agreement 
Salary Administration 
A. Bi-weekly pay periods — 26 pay periods per calendar year 
B. Time cards completed by all non-exempt employees (non-supervisory employees) 
C. Each employee will be evaluated in 6 months and 12 months after initial hiring 
and at least once each year thereafter. 
Pay Rate: $ ( P'OO &$r hour/per month (circle one) 
Pay Commences: ~ -?> 1 
D. 
E. 
F, 
C. 
-?r 
?-735C-
J23L. Select full-time, part-t ime. 
Normal Workplace: 
Working Status: 
or temporary. 
List of Potential Benefits 
A. Involuntary Absence from Work (leave credit 90-day waiting period) — 
1 day per month for full-time employees; 1 day (8 hours) per 2 months 
for those working at least 20 hours per week. 
B. Long-term Disability (ful l - t ime, 25 years old 6 1 year service) — standard 
plan 
C. Medical Insurance — self-funded or choice of health maintenance organiza-
tions where available. 20 hours per week qualifies for employee coverage; 
32 hours per week for employee-dependent coverage. 
D. Croup Term Life Insurance — 20 hours per week or 1000 hours per year 
E. Accidental Death 6 Dismemberment Insurance — 20 hours per week or 1000 
hours per year 
F. Retirement 6 Pension Plan — 1000 hours per year, 21 years old 6 1 year 
service 
C. Stock Plans — 1000 hours per year , 21 years old 6 1 year service 
H. Paid Holidays — compensation for normally scheduled number of hours 
I . Vacation — compensation for normally scheduled number of hours 
J . Service Charge Exempt — checking account at Zions Bank 
K. Service Charge Exempt — travelers checks, cashiers checks 6 gift checks 
at Zions Bank 
L. Safe Deposit Box — rental free at Zions Bank 
M. Reduced rates on Zions Bank MasterCard, VISA, company-sponsored I n -
stalment Loans and Home Equity Credit Line (min. 6 months service), and 
Mortgage Loans (min. 1 year service) 
N. Discount rates on special attractions periodically available. Inquire at 
Personnel Department. 
O. Movie Tickets — discount prices 
P. Educational Assistance Programs 
Q. Savings Plans — automatic deductions to Savings Account, IRA 6 Payroll 
Savings Bonds 
R. Employee Money Market Plan 
S. Automatic paycheck deposit to personal checking account 
T . Job Posting Program 
U. Earned Income Credit 
V . Upon termination of employment all the above-mentioned benefits will be 
forfeited. 
Note: Insurance Plans C, D 6 E are subject to waiting period of 60 days, 
surance forms must be completed at least by the 31st day after eligibil ity; 
a medical exam may be necessary to become eligible. 
I I I . Certification 
The i n -
otherwise. 
The above documents, agreements and benefits have been explained to me. I 
understand them and have been given the opportunity to enroll In the programs 
for which I am eligible. This Agreement does NOT constitute enrollment in the 
benefit programs found In Section I I . 
I understand 
the com pan 
i t I have the right to 
Stains a^imilar r ight . 
terminate my /emp!oyment at any time and 
Employee's Signature 5 ^ ? . ( <^< 
ZB000188 
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JNewsbreak 
ZIONS WEEKLY NEWS UPDATE Vol. 2, No. 38 September 20, 1994 
ZIONS BANK RESPONDS TO LAWSUIT 
Several news stories have appeared on television and in newspapers during the past 
few days regarding a lawsuit filed by a Zions Bank employee. The lawsuit alleges that Zions 
Bank prevented the employee from taking time off work to obtain appropriate medical care, 
resulting in a severe medical problem. Zions Bank issued a statement, expressing sympathy 
for our employee and for her family. 
She has developed a difficult medical problem. However, after investigating the 
claims contained in her lawsuit, Zions First National Bank categorically denies that her 
failure to seek timely medical attention was caused by Zions Bank. The Company believes 
that neither Zions Bank nor any of its managers have prevented her from seeing a doctor. 
The health and welfare of employees are important to Zions Bancorporation. Zions 
policies provide employees with adequate time to seek needed medical treatment. 
ZIONS ANNOUNCES FORMATION OF ZIONS EMPLOYEE SERVICE TEAM ("ZEST) 
Harris Simmons, President and CEO, announced yesterday the formation of the new 
Zions Employee Service Team, or "ZEST' for 
short. 
Zions employees who participate in 
ZEST will have many opportunities throughout 
the year to help individuals in need and to Zionj Employee Service Team 
serve their communities. "Zions employees have 
a great tradition of helping their neighbors,11 said Mr. Simmons. "Zest will help to identify 
needs, alert interested Zions employees, and organize the manpower to help meet those 
needs. In this way, more Zions employees can involve themselves in truly making a 
difference in our communities. That's what ZEST is all about." 
Bret D. Passey, manager of the Layton Antelope Drive office, has been named as 
chairman of ZEST. According to Bret, "Employees can participate in a variety of ZEST 
projects, including the annual Paint-a-Thon, donations to needy families, and other 
charitable and community-oriented events. We'll keep everyone informed about 
opportunities to participate in ZEST projects." 
The purpose of ZEST is to allow more Zions employees to participate in community 
service projects. Because many branches and departments organize their own service 
projects, the formation of ZEST will allow more involvement in those projects by other 
Zions employees. Watch for ZEST announcements in Teller 
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK SIGNATURE PAGE 
We are providing you with a copy of Zions Employee 
Handbook to assist you in understanding Zions' employee 
benefits and important policies and procedures. This Hand-
book is an important tool to refer to, as questions arise. 
To insure that you do not miss the opportunity to partici-
pate in the employee benefits which suit you, please read 
the employee benefits leaflets in the inside of the back cover 
of the Handbook. These leaflets explain, among other 
things, enrollment deadlines. 
A summary of various policies and procedures are found 
on the numbered pages of the Handbook. See your Branch 
or Department Manager for full details of policies and pro-
cedures. 
Please understand that this Handbook is subject to 
change and that change in policies may supersede, modify 
or eliminate the policies in this booklet 
We hope the Handbook will be of assistance to you. 
Please sign below acknowledging receipt of the Handbook 
and your understanding of Hs significance to your employ-
ment. 
